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INTRODUCTION
Although to some extent section 1 of the fourteenth amendment is self-
executing in its command that "[nJo State shall. . . deny to any person...
the equal protection of the laws," the framers of the amendment, in section
5, vested power in Congress to enforce the provisions of the amendment.'
The contours of congressional power are far from clear, however. The two
major areas of controversy concern congressional power to reach private con-
duct and congressional power to define the substance of section 1 guarantees.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states:
§ I All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
§ 5 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
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It is the purpose of this article to examine briefly the status of the law in
these two areas of fourteenth amendment interpretation, to consider the leg-
islative history of the amendment, and to try to determine the extent to
which current interpretation is in harmony with the goals of the Congress
that passed the amendment. In addition, it is the thesis of this article that
the concept of "equality of result," which is gaining currency at the expense
of the traditional "equality of opportunity," is quite different from the con-
cept of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the four-
teenth amendment. Moreover, the "New Equality," espoused by certain
elements of modern society and reflected in some recent Supreme Court
opinions, is ultimately harmful to society because it makes equality the pre-
mier social goal, and other traditional values, such as liberty, fall by the
wayside. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the New Equality is incompatible
with liberty. Finally, this article will attempt to show a number of social
costs-in addition to the sacrifice of liberty-that must be paid in order to
continue the crusade for the New Equality.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REACH PRIVATE
ACTION UNDER SECTION 5
A. The Guest Case
The leading case dealing with congressional power to reach private con-
duct under the fourteenth amendment is United States v. Guest, 2 a criminal
action in which six defendants were indicted for criminal conspiracy in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 241.3 The indictment comprised five numbered
paragraphs, two of which are of particular interest to this inquiry. The sec-
ond paragraph alleged that the defendants interfered with the free exercise
and enjoyment of Negro citizens in "[t]he right to the equal utilization, with-
out discrimination upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of
Athens, Georgia. . . . "4 The fourth paragraph alleged that the defendants
had conspired to interfere with Negro citizens in the exercise and enjoyment
of "[tihe right to travel freely to and from the State of Georgia and to use
highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce within
the State of Georgia." '5
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart stated that a valid cause of action
was stated in paragraph 2 because the indictment alleged that one of the
means by which the objects of the conspiracy were achieved was "[b]y caus-
2. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) states:
Consp'racy against nghts of atizens. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of an-
other, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
4. 383 U.S. at 753.
5. Id at 757.
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ing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had
committed criminal acts."'6 The Court held that this allegation was suffi-
ciently broad to cover a charge of active connivance by officials of the state
and, therefore, was not defective for failure to allege state action.
With respect to the fourth paragraph, Justice Stewart stated that the
right to travel is a fundamental right completely independent of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, the right is protected against private, as well as
state, interference. If the right infringed were guaranteed only by the four-
teenth amendment, then only state interference could be reached.
Justice Clark's concurring opinion, 7 in which Justices Black and Fortas
joined, took exception to Justice Stewart's assumption that paragraph 2 of
the indictment could stand only if some state action were found. Justice
Clark made the sweeping statement that "there now can be no doubt that
the specific language of section 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws pun-
ishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with
fourteenth amendment rights."8
Justice Brennan's opinion,9 concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which he was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, also took
exception to Justice Stewart's conclusion that section 241's protection of
"right[s] . . . secured . . . by the Constitution" reaches only conspiracies in
which discriminatory conduct by state officers is involved. Justice Brennan
argued that section 241 reaches private conspiracies not because the four-
teenth amendment of its own force prohibits such conspiracies, but because
section 241 is a valid exercise of congressional power which, under section 5,
can reach all conspiracies. Moreover, he argued, the right to equal utiliza-
tion of state facilities is a right secured by the Constitution within the mean-
ing of section 241. He stated that a right can be "secured by the
Constitution" within the meaning of section 241, even though only govern-
mental interferences with the right are covered by the Constitution itself.
Justice Harlan dissented from that part of the Court's opinion that held
that the right to travel is protected against private interference. ' 0 He stated
that it is "dubious that the Constitution was intended to create certain rights
of private individuals as against other private individuals. The Constitu-
tional Convention was called to establish a nation, not to reform the com-
mon law . ... II He did, however, state that there are a few rights
protected against individual interference that have been read into the Con-
stitution, such as rights against interferences with voting in federal elections,
with federal law enforcement, and with communication with the federal
government.
An interesting feature of the Guest decision is that six members of the
Court specifically stated that Congress has power under section 5 to reach
6. Id. at 756.
7. Id. at 761.
8. id at 762.
9. Id at 774.
10. Id at 762.
11. Id at 771.
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conduct by private persons that is not covered by section 1 itself, although
that is not the holding of the Court. Neither Justice Brennan's nor Justice
Clark's opinion goes so far as to say, however, that fourteenth amendment
rights are rights against other individuals. They both take the position that
fourteenth amendment rights are rights against the state, but that individual
interferences with this relationship between the states and individuals may
be reached by Congress under section 5.
The law has not changed since Guest. The Supreme Court has never
held that section 5 gives Congress the general power to reach private con-
duct; it has not needed to. The Court's recent expansion of its interpretation
of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment' 2 has eliminated
the need for expansion of the fourteenth amendment, at least with respect to
racial issues.
The leading modern case concerning congressional power to reach pri-
vate action under the thirteenth amendment isJones v. A_)fred H. Mayer Co. ,13
in which the Court held for the first time that 42 U.S.C. § 1982'4 bars all
racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or rental of property,
and that so construed the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power to
enforce the thirteenth amendment. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,' 5 the Court held
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) 16 was a valid exercise of congressional power to
reach private conduct under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment, and, in
Runyon v. McCraqy, 7 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198118 prohibits private
schools from discriminating on the basis of race, using the questionable ra-
tionale that the power to make and enforce contracts under the statute im-
poses a duty on individuals not to refuse to contract for racial reasons.
The principal drawback (for those who favor a broad congressional
power in this area) of using the thirteenth amendment to reach private con-
duct is the inability of Congress to reach the conduct of individuals who are
discriminating on the basis of something other than race.19
12. Section 2 of the thirteenth amendment is substantially similar to section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment. The thirteenth amendment, section 2, provides that: "Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
13. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). For criticism of this decision, see Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: Judicial Acti:t'm Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property."
15. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976) (renumbered as § 1985(3) in Supp. III 1979). This statute
provides a civil cause of action for victims of conspiracies which have as their purpose "depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws .
17. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) states: "All persons . . .shall have the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
19. The issue whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985 covers private sex discrimination was presented to
the Court in Great Amenan Fed Sa. & Loan Ass'n v. Nowotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). The question
was not resolved, because the Court held that the plaintiff could not avoid following the proce-
dures of Title VII by going under § 1985; the Court therefore vacated and remanded to the
court of appeals, which had held that § 1985 covered sex discrimination.
[Vol. 59:3
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Very little is certain in the area of fourteenth amendment interpreta-
tion, but it is virtually certain that the issue of congressional power to reach
private conduct under section 5 will once again be before the Court. Thus,
it may be useful at this point to examine the legislative history of the four-
teenth amendment for clues concerning the intent of the framers of the
amendment.
B. The Legislatv've Hzstoy of the Fourteenth Amendment
Vast amounts of research and analysis have been undertaken to ascer-
tain the "intent of the framers" of the fourteenth amendment. 20 It is not the
purpose of this article to perform another exhaustive study of the subject or
even to recapitulate that which has already been done. Rather, this article
will rely on the work of others and attempt to glean from other writers some
kind of insight into the problem of legislative intent.21
The obvious starting point for determining the meaning of a provision
is its language. The fourteenth amendment states "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 5 of the amendment gives Congress "power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article." The language seems clear:
States may not deny any person equal protection of the laws, and Congress
has the power to ensure that they do not. Moreover, the text says "equal
protection of the laws"; it does not say "equal treatment." Because of the
focus on laws, it seems unlikely that regulation of private conduct was con-
templated. Given the plain meaning of the amendment, the burden should
be on those claiming the framers had a different intent.
There were several versions of the fourteenth amendment introduced
prior to the introduction of the version that made its way into the Constitu-
tion. Although there were many differences between the various versions,
there were essentially two basic forms-the "positive" form and the "nega-
tive" form. The positive form is represented in the versions of the amend-
ment submitted by John Bingham, which in one form or another gave
20. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; C. FAIR-
MAN, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-1888, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES pt. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION]; H. FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Berger, The
Fourteenth Amendment: The Framers' Design, 30 S.C.L. REV. 495 (1979); Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Lightfrom the F#feenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311 (1979); Bickel, The On'ginal Understand-
ing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Frank & Munro, The Original Understand-
ing of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); Gaffney, History and Legal
Interpretation." The Early Distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25 CATH. U.L.
REV. 207 (1976); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered.: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH.
L. REV. 1049 (1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Righl" to Vote, and the Under-
standing of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33.
21. Not everyone agrees that legislative intent is of particular importance. See, e.g., Brest,
The Misconcezved Quest for the Onginal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). For the view that
opinions in Congress ranged so widely that the specific intent is impossible to glean, see Frank &
Munro, supra note 20.
1982]
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Congress power to pass laws to secure to all persons the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws. 22 The negative form is represented in the versions submit-
ted by Thaddeus Stevens, which stated that all laws shall operate
impartially, or that no state shall discriminate.23 The final product is some-
thing of a hybrid of the two versions-section 1 embodying the negative
version, and section 5 acting as a grant of power to Congress.
The question here is simply whether the grant of power to Congress is
merely to ensure that "no state shall deny" the equal protection of the laws,
or whether it is an affirmative grant to Congress of a general legislative
power with respect to life, liberty, and property. In other words, does Con-
gress have the power under section 5 only to protect the rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment, or does Congress have the power to protect inter-
ests similar to those safeguarded by fourteenth amendment rights? If Con-
gress has the power only to protect rights guaranteed by the amendment,
then Congress cannot reach private conduct.
Much of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment arises out of a careless use of the term "right," and a failure to
understand that for every right there is a dutv.2 4 Indeed, the term "right" in
the absence of a correlative duty is meanin;L1ess. Section 1 of the amend-
ment gives persons within the jurisdiction of the state the right to be free
from discriminatory treatment by the state. Who, then, has the duty to pro-
vide non-discriminatory treatment? The obvious-and only-answer is that
the duty falls upon the state.
Even the members of the Guest Court who argued that section 5 gave
Congress the power to reach individual conduct appear to accept this con-
clusion. Those members of the Court, however, seem to argue that section 5
gives Congress power not only to protect fourteenth amendment rights, but
also to protect the interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment.
They recognize that the fourteenth amendment does not of its own force
impose a duty upon private citizens to act in any particular manner toward
other citizens. It does, however, encompass certain interests, such as equal
treatment with respect to life, liberty, and property. Six of the nine members
of the Guest Court would allow Congress, then, to ban activities which vio-
late the spirit of section 1, but not the letter, much the way the Federal
Trade Commission Act 2 5 allows the FTC to reach violations of the spirit of
the antitrust laws.26 What is questionable in the economic sphere is to be
abhorred in the constitutional sphere-if section 1 imposes no duty on indi-
22. For example, on February 3, 1866, Bingham introduced the following amendment:
"Congress shall have power... to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in the several States (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property (5th Amend.)." Reconstnmcion and
Reunion, supra note 20, at 1274.
23. For example, on January 12, 1866, Stevens introduced the following amendment: "All
laws, state or national, shall operate impartially and equally on all persons without regard to
race or color." -d at 1271.
24. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptios as Appled to Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
26. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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viduals, then how can section 5, which is merely power to enforce section 1,
impose that duty?
One of the leading proponents of the view that Congress has the power
to reach private conduct under section 5 is Jacobus ten Broek. Ten Broek
argues that the fourteenth amendment is an abolitionist document and that
pre-Civil War abolitionist doctrine should be examined for elucidation of the
content of the amendment. 27 Ten Broek further contends that the negative
form of the amendment was adopted because the positive form made protec-
tion of the amendment only as certain as Republican control of Congress-if
protection were to come only from Congress, a hostile Congress could with-
draw the protection. Therefore, argues ten Broek, it was necessary to make
the amendment self-executing. This argument skillfully avoids the main
question: Upon whom is the duty to rest? If Congress actually intended to
impose a duty upon individuals as well as states and wanted the amendment
to be self-executing, why did the drafters not write "no state nor any individ-
ual shall deny . . ."? Certainly the framers were not so inept as to impose
the duty on the wrong party in their zeal to make the amendment self-exe-
cuting. Ten Broek argues further that the phrase "no state shall" in conjunc-
tion with section 5 must grant Congress the power to supply protection and
that, therefore, the negative form has the same meaning as the positive form.
Ten Broek seizes upon statements in the debates on the amendment by
Robert Hale, a conservative Republican who, in expressing his reservations
about the positive form of the amendment, stated that if one reads the lan-
guage precisely, it is "a grant of the fullest and most ample power to Con-
gress to make all laws 'necessary and proper to secure to all persons in the
several states protection in the right of life, liberty, and property,' with the
simple proviso that such protection shall be equal."128 There are obvious
problems in relying on statements expressing opposition to a given piece of
legislation because of a tendency on the part of those who oppose legislation
to predict horrendous results if the legislation should pass. Moreover, ten
Broek essentially ignores the significance of Thaddeus Stevens' reply to Hale:
Does the gentleman mean to say that, under this provision, Con-
gress could interfere in any case where the legislation of a state was
equal, impartial to all? Or is it not simply to provide that, where
any state makes a distinction in the same law between different
classes of individuals, Congress shall have the power to correct such
discrimination and inequality? 29
As a matter of statutory construction, statements by proponents of legislation
would seem somewhat more reliable than statements by opponents. For ex-
ample, how many people would wish to rely on Phyllis Schlafly's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Rights Amendment?30
Ten Broek also ignores a number of statements by John Bingham, nota-
bly one made in support of the final draft of the amendment. Bingham
27. Ten Broek, supra note 20. See also Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73).
28. Ten Broek, supra note 20, at 212.
29. Id at n.6.
30. See generally P. SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN (1977).
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remarked that section 1 would fill a great need: "[T]hat is, to protect by
national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic
and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same
shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. '3 1
Ten Broek also points to the large number of references in the debates
to accounts of individual atrocities-lynchings, beatings, and the like-and
argues that victims of these crimes were intended to be protected by the
amendment and, unless that amendment reaches private conduct, the
amendment is a futile gesture.32 Congress undoubtedly was concerned with
such occurrences, but ten Broek misapprehends the intended remedy. It was
not to punish the perpetrators of the crimes, but to punish state officials
when they failed to protect the victims. 33 The words of John Bingham best
show the remedy desired:
The question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment
to the people of the United States the power, by legislative enact-
ment, to punish ofti'als of States for violation of the oaths enjoined
upon them by their Constitution? That is the question and the
whole question . . . . [If state legislators] conspire together to en-
act laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property, the
Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer
before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths
and the rights of their fellow men.
34
Given the unambiguous wording of the amendment, and absent any
convincing evidence that the Thirty-ninth Congress intended the amend-
ment to encompass private conduct, the amendment should not be extended
to cover such conduct.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POWER To DEFINE THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
Beyond the issue of whether Congress has the power to reach private
conduct under section 5 is the question whether Congress can define the
substantive content of the amendment. This question has never been an-
swered definitively.
The leading modern case dealing with this issue is Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan.35 Morgan involved a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965,36 which provided that no person who had successfully completed
the sixth grade at an accredited Puerto Rican school where the language of
instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote in any
election because of an inability to read and write English. Plaintiffs were
31. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2547 (1866), cited in RECONSTRUCTION AND REUN-
ION, supra note 20, at 1287 (emphasis added).
32. Ten Broek, supra note 20, at 203-04.
33. Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crnes under the Fourteenth Amendment The Ortignal
Understanding, 43 NOrRE DAME L. 317 (1967-68).
34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (emphasis added).
35. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
36. 42 U.S.C. §1973b(e) (1976).
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registered voters of New York challenging the constitutionality of section
4(e).
The New York Attorney General argued that Congress can exercise its
section 5 power only if the judicial branch determines that the state law is
prohibited by the amendment Congress seeks-to enforce. Because Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections3 7 approved literacy tests not used for
invidious discrimination, the state argued that Congress had no power to
prohibit their use.
The question thus presented to the Supreme Court was whether Con-
gress could forbid the use of literacy tests even if the Court might not have
found such use to be a violation of section 1. The Court answered in the
affirmative, but the decision rested on alternative holdings. The Court held
that congressional power under section 5 is the same kind of broad power
expressed in the necessary and proper clause,38 and that there were two pos-
sible ways Congress might have exercised this power in passing section 4(e).
First, Congress could have decided that the enhanced political power
obtained through exercise of the franchise would be helpful in gaining non-
discriminatory public services for the Puerto Rican community. This is a
standard necessary and proper clause argument: The Puerto Ricans have a
right to non-discriminatory treatment, Congress has the power to guarantee
it, and Congress has chosen to guarantee it in this manner. The analysis is in
accord with Chief Justice John Marshall's classic formulation of the neces-
sary and proper power in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. '39
There is nothing out of the ordinary about this first alternative holding in
Morgan, and it is a statement of the law with which few would disagree. The
second alternative holding is, however, if not revolutionary, at least
dramatic.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, also held that Congress could
have decided that literacy tests are a denial of equal protection, notwith-
standing the fact that the Court reached a contrary conclusion. Justice
Brennan's opinion displayed a great deal of deference to Congress' "specially
informed legislative competence" 40 and stated that it was "Congress' prerog-
ative to weigh these competing considerations," 4 1 and that it "is enough that
we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate [its] judgment. '42
One might read this opinion narrowly and argue that Congress had merely
determined (or could have determined) that in this particular instance the
use of literacy tests was a denial of equal protection because the tests were
used discriminatorily. There is, however, some rather broad language in the
opinion that suggests that Justice Brennan had more than that in mind. He
37. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ed. 18.
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
40. 384 U.S. at 656.
41. Id
42. Id
19821
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stated that "Congress might also have questioned whether denial of a right
so precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or appropriate
means . . . of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the
franchise." '4 3 Here, Justice Brennan is essentially allowing Congress to make
the decision that literacy tests might violate the equal protection clause, even
when not used for invidious discrimination, despite the Court's contrary res-
olution of that question in Lasst'er.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that the
literacy test was reasonably designed to serve a legitimate state interest.
Moreover, he argued that under Marbugy v. MAadon4 4 it is a judicial question
whether a practice is a violation of the Constitution. Justice Harlan also
distinguished between the question of whether a statute is appropriate reme-
dial legislation to cure an established violation and the question of whether
there has in fact been an infringement of a constitutional command. The
fact that there had been no findings of any discrimination in voting to sup-
port section 4(e) as appropriate remedial legislation led Justice Harlan to
dissent. He also argued that Justice Brennan's deference to Congress' special
legislative competence and to its ability to weigh competing considerations
would allow Congress to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of
the Court as well as to expand them. 45
Justice Brennan responded to that argument in a footnote in which he
stated that
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in
the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute
equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We em-
phasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees.
46
This reassurance, however, is off-target. It begs the question to state that
Congress' power is limited to enforcing the guarantees of the amendment;
that is a statement acceptable to all. The question, left unanswered by the
footnote, is who decides what the amendment is to guarantee?
The conclusion to be reached from Justice Brennan's opinion is that
Congress' view of the content of the guarantee controls when it is more ex-
pansive than that of the Court, while the Court's interpretation applies when
the Court's interpretation is more expansive. This is superficially analogous
to the doctrine that a state court may interpret a provision of its constitution
that is identical to a provision of the United States Constitution in such a
way that the state constitution grants more protection, but it may not apply
its state constitution in such a way that does not provide the minimum pro-
tection required under the United States Constitution. 47 The analogy
43. Id at 654.
44. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Id at 651 n.10.
47. Set generally Brennan, State Constitutions and ihe Protecton of Indzvidual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
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breaks down, however, in two respects. First, the state's interpretation and
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation are interpretations of dif-
ferent documents. Second, the supreme court of a state may not interpret
the United States Constitution in a manner different from the interpretation
provided by the United States Supreme Court, even if the state court inter-
prets constitutional guarantees more liberally.
48
Beyond the naked assertion that Congress may only enlarge, not dilute,
there is no explanation of why this should be. If Congress has superior com-
petence, it should be deferred to; if it does not have superior competence, it
should not be deferred to. There is no principled way to distinguish enlarge-
ment from dilution.49
The theory that Congress may expand, but not restrict, the scope of
constitutional guarantees has been called the "ratchet theory. ' '50 In addi-
tion to the problem of determining why the ratchet can turn only one way, is
the problem in some instances of determining in which direction the ratchet
is turning.5 1 For example, suppose Congress decided to pass a statute creat-
ing a newsman's privilege in state courts or enlarging the power of state
courts to issue gag orders. Such statutes would involve conflicts between the
first amendment rights of the press and the fifth and sixth amendment rights
of defendants. If Congress has a specially informed legislative competence, it
should be allowed to weigh the competing considerations and have its con-
clusion accorded the same deference as in Morgan.
The next case to deal with congressional power to define the substance
of fourteenth amendment guarantees was Oregon v. Mitchell,52 in which the
constitutionality of provisions of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act was challenged. The challenged provisions provided for a nationwide
extension of the literacy test ban and an extension of the right to vote to
eighteen-year-olds in state and federal elections. The literacy test ban was
upheld unanimously. Justice Harlan, who dissented in Morgan, accepted as a
basis for congressional action actual findings by Congress that literacy tests
were tools of discrimination. Because of his firm conviction that the four-
teenth amendment has no application to voting cases, he concurred on the
ground that the ban was a legitimate exercise of Congress' enforcement
power under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment. 53
48. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
49. See Burt, Miranda and Title II A Morganatic Mamage, 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 81; Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox,
Foreword- Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91
(1966); Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 656 (1977).
50. Cohen, supra note 49, at 606.
51. Id. at 607.
52. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
53. Justice Harlan argued consistently throughout his career that voting was not covered
by the fourteenth amendment. He pointed to the fact that constitutional amendments were
necessary to bring about abolition of state restrictions on voting with respect to race, sex, and
failure to pay a poll tax (amendments XV, XIX, and XXIV, respectively). Furthermore, Jus-
tice Harlan convincingly argued that the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment dem-
onstrates that voting was intended to be excluded from the protection of the amendment, as
does the very text of section 2 of the amendment, which calls for a decrease in representation in
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The more interesting aspect of Oregon v. Mitchell lies in the treatment of
the eighteen-year-old voting provision. Four members of the Court argued
that Congress has the power to regulate voter qualifications in both federal
and state elections, 54 and four members of the Court argued that Congress
could regulate in neither. 55 Only one justice, Justice Black, believed that
Congress could regulate federal, but not state, elections. Because of the shift-
ing majorities, Justice Black wrote the decision of the Court.
To support his decision that Congress may regulate federal elections,
Justice Black relied on article I, section 4 of the Constitution, 56 an argument
of no relevance to the topic of this article. Justice Black also held that con-
gressional regulation of state elections was an invalid exercise of congres-
sional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, because the
power to determine voter qualifications is vital to the "separate and in-
dependent existence of the States."' 57 He relied on the fact that there had
been no finding that the twenty-one-year-old vote requirements were used
by states to disenfranchise on the basis of race. The applicability of Justice
Black's reasoning to cases not involving voting is doubtful, for his opinion
states that "where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved
by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so
closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race."'58
Justice Black identified three limitations on congressional power:
1) Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitu-
tion;59 2) section 5 was not intended, and may not be used, to strip states of
the power of self-government or to "convert our national government of enu-
merated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over
every inch of the whole Nation";6° and 3) Congress may not undercut other
fourteenth amendment guarantees. 6 '
Justice Douglas would have upheld the application of the eighteen-
year-old vote requirement to state elections.62 He stated that "Congress
might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was
needed in the interest of equal protection, '63 deferring to Congress' judg-
Congress of those states that denied blacks the vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). In fact, at the time of passage of the amendment, only six states had
extended the franchise to Negroes. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and
the Understanding of the Thirty-Nnth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 70.
54. Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.
55. Burger, C.J., Stewart, Blackmun, and Harlan, JJ.
56. Article I, § 4 states, in pertinent part: "The Times, Places and Manner of Holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 3.
57. 400 U.S. at 125.
58. Id at 130.
59. Id at 128. The fourteenth amendment of its own force, however, gives Congress the
power to limit a state's eleventh amendment immunity. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
60. 400 U.S. at 128.
61. Id This harks back to Justice Brennan's footnote in Morgan. See text accompanying
notes 45-49 supra.
62. 400 U.S. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id at 141.
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ment concerning the substance of the equal protection clause.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, would have
upheld the eighteen-year-old requirement on either of two alternative
grounds. First, he argued that it is questionable whether denying the vote to
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one could withstand the scru-
tiny of the Court under the equal protection clause. 64 Second, he argued
that even if the state laws were proper under section 1 of the amendment,
"proper regard for the special function of Congress in making determina-
tions of legislative fact compels this Court to respect those determinations
unless they are contradicted by evidence far stronger than anything that has
been adduced in these cases. ' ' 6
5
Justice Brennan also stated that the twenty-one-year-old vote require-
ment would be subjected to strict scrutiny and a state would have to show a
compelling interest in the requirement. 66 Justice Brennan went on to state
that as long as Congress' decision that the equal protection clause requires
the extension of the franchise to eighteen-year-olds is rational, no more must
be shown to support its decision.
Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
would deny Congress the power to set qualifications in either state or federal
elections, and stated that section 302 is valid
only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of
eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive
constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the
clause, and what state interests are "compelling."
'6 7
Because Congress does not have the power to define the substance of the
amendment, Justice Stewart argued that section 302 was invalid.
Justice Harlan also argued that Congress could not lower the voting age
in either federal or state elections.6 He stated that the extent of congres-
sional power is to prevent or remedy discrimination that is within the pur-
view of the amendment. He characterized the suggestion that members of
the age group between eighteen and twenty-one were threatened with un-
constitutional discrimination as "little short of fanciful."'6 9 He went on to
say that "all the evidence indicates that Congress-led on by recent decisions
of this Court-thought simply that eighteen-year-olds were fairly entitled to
the vote and that Congress could give it to them by legislation." '70 This
comment points out a serious problem with deference to Congress in this
area. Realistically, Congress does not come to the conclusion that a given
64. Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id
66. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his opinion, this is an impossible standard to set. Id
at 294-95 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that no state could
possibly demonstrate a compelling interest in drawing the line at one age or another. The only
realistic approach is to determine whether a state has a compelling interest in setting an age
qualification and then to determine whether the age selected is a reasonable one.
67. Id at 296.
68. Id at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id at 212.
70. Id at 213.
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situation (for example, a twenty-one-year-old voting requirement) is a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause and then undertake to correct it. Instead,
Congress reaches the conclusion that a different situation is politically-not
constitutionally--desirable and then seeks to find some constitutional au-
thority for its action. Although the same criticism is often made of decisions
by the Court, Congress is, in principle as well as in fact, a political body; the
Court may at times respond to political pressure, but it is not overtly a polit-
ical institution.
It appears that in Oregon v. Mitchell there are five justices (Black, Doug-
las, Brennan, White and Marshall) who believe that, at least when Congress
is not impinging upon concerns left explicitly to the states, Congress may
expand the substance of fourteenth amendment guarantees.
More recently, in Ciy of Rome v. United States ,7 1 the Court was faced with
the question of the constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
which requires "preclearance" by the United States Attorney General of
changes in voting practices in "covered" jurisdictions. Section 5 permits
such change only if the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color." The case centered around changes in the electoral system of
Rome, Georgia, primarily a change whereby city commissioners would be
elected at-large within wards. On the same day in a separate case, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of at-large elections in Mobile,
Alabama, where there was a racially disparate effect. 72
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in City of Rome, upheld the
challenged section of the Voting Rights Act as valid legislation under section
2 of the fifteenth amendment, despite the City's argument that, since section
1 of the amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, Congress is
without power under the enforcement clause to reach conduct having only a
discriminatory effect. Justice Marshall held that the preclearance provisions
requiring both a lack of discriminatory purpose and a lack of discriminatory
effect were appropriate remedial legislation.
Although City of Rome was decided on the basis of the fifteenth amend-
ment, it is relevant to fourteenth amendment analysis because of the similar-
ity between the enforcement clauses of the two amendments, and because of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, 73 in which he discussed the history of the Court's
treatment of the "remedial versus substantive" debate. Justice Rehnquist
argued that there are three theories of congressional enforcement power rele-
vant to the case. The first is that if the proposed changes violated section 1
of the amendment then, without question, Congress could prohibit their im-
plementation. Second, Congress could act to enforce the judicially estab-
lished substantive provisions of the amendments. The third theory is that
Congress has the power to determine that electoral changes with a disparate
71. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
72. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile's plan was not covered by the Voting
Rights Act because Mobile was not seeking to change its system; it had been in effect since 1911.
Id at 59.
73. 446 U.S. at 206 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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impact on race violate the Constitution. 74
Justice Rehnquist argued that neither of the first two theories could
support the application of the Voting Rights Act to Rome. He argued that
under Mobile v. Bolden Rome's changes were not unconstitutional, and that
because of a lower court finding that the city had engaged in no purposeful
discrimination for almost two decades, application of the Act was not an
appropriate remedial measure. 75 Therefore, argued Justice Rehnquist, ap-
plication of the preclearance provision to Rome was constitutional only if
Congress had the power to determine that electoral changes with "a dispa-
rate impact on a minority group's ability to elect a candidate of their race
violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. ' 76 He went on to argue
that a majority of the Court has never ratified congressional power to define
the substantive content of the Civil War amendments. 77  It should be
remembered, however, that Justice Black's opinion in Oregon can be read to
say that Congress does have some power to define the substance of the
amendments' guarantees. 78 Based on his reasoning in Oregon, however, Jus-
tice Black would probably not have upheld this particular exercise of con-
gressional power.
III. COUNTERVAILING FORCES LIMITING CONGRESSIONAL POWER
There are two separate considerations that counsel restraint in inter-
preting congressional power under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War
amendments: federalism and individual freedom. 79 Interpretations that
would allow Congress to reach private conduct under the fourteenth amend-
ment primarily implicate concerns of individual liberty-if Congress grants
individuals rights as against other individuals, it necessarily imposes a duty
on the latter, thereby restricting individual liberty.8 0 Interpretations that
would allow Congress to define the substance of the amendments' guarantees
implicate primarily federalism concerns, at least so long as private conduct
cannot be reached. The extent of the impingement would, of course, depend
upon the expansiveness of the Court's view of the grant of federal power.
Therefore, speculation about possible effects of the view that Congress is em-
powered to reach private conduct and define the scope of the amendments
must be rather general, and only a few possible conflicts between congres-
sional power and either federalism or individual liberty will be addressed.
Without question, the fourteenth amendment was intended to be a
74. 446 U.S. at 210.
75. The Court held that the only way that Rome could "bail out" from under the
preclearance provisions was if the entire State of Georgia could bail out. In order for the entire
state to bail out, Georgia would have to show that every political subdivision had freed itself
from discrimination, thereby making every political subdivision in the state hostage to the trans-
gressions of a single subdivision. Id at 203-04 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. Id at 220-21.
78. See text accompanying note 59 uspra.
79. See Cohen, supra note 49. Cohen argues that the federalism issue is the major constitu-
tional concern. The federalism concern may, however, be viewed as an aspect of the individual
freedom concern, because decreased state autonomy leads to a centralization of power.
80. See text accompanying notes 2-19 supra.
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limit on state power.8 ' The language of the amendment itself makes that
much clear. Moreover, the Thirty-ninth Congress intended that Congress,
not the courts, would be the primary enforcers of the amendment, 2 al-
though Justice Brennan dismisses that issue as "of academic interest only.
'
"
83
It is also rather clear from the legislative history, however, that the intent of
the framers was not to effect too drastic a change in the federal system.8 4 An
expansive reading of section 5, in conjunction with current notions concern-
ing broad congressional powers under the commerce power8 5 and the spend-
ing power,8 6 would render the states hollow shells.
In addition to the regulation of voting, which was, without a doubt,
beyond the intent of the framers, 7 the most obvious exercise of congres-
sional power would be in the area of state justice systems. Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has stated that the fourteenth amendment does not
require twelve-man juries8 8 or indictment by grand jury8 9 in state criminal
proceedings, nor does the amendment prohibit capital punishment per se,9°
Congress could presumably regulate in these areas.
Congress also might mandate bilingual education, even in the absence
of federal funding. It might find that in order for all children to enjoy the
equal protection of the laws, they must all be taught in their native tongues.
If Congress is permitted to weigh competing constitutional values, it
might also establish a newsman's privilege in state and federal courts.9 1 In
Welsh v. United States,92 three justices93 were willing to defer to Congress'
balancing of values of religious freedom and Congress' power to raise armies,
in Congress' establishment of criteria for conscientious objection to the draft.
An even broader reading might allow Congress to make its own determina-
tion of what constitutes a taking of private property, thereby allowing Con-
gress to regulate local zoning practices.
This is not to suggest that these particular acts will come to pass, only
that they are the kinds of actions Congress might take in exercise of an ex-
pansive power. Recent growth in power of the federal government has de-
creased in force the authority of Herbert Wechsler's classic statement on
81. Ste note 59 supra.
82. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at 221-29.
83. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 263-64 n.37 (1970).
84. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949). Fairman states:
The freedom that the states traditionally have exercised to develop their own systems
of administering justice, repels any thought that the federal provisions on grand jury,
criminal jury, and civil jury were fastened upon them in 1868. Congress would not
have attempted such a thing, the country would not have stood for it, the legislatures
would not have ratified.
Id at 137.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
86. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
87. See note 53 supra.
88. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
89. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
90. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
91. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
92. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
93. Burger, C.J., White & Stewart, JJ.
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federalism that "[f]ar from a national authority that is expansionist by na-
ture, the inherent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse, necessitat-
ing the widest support before intrusive measures of importance can receive
significant consideration." '94 In theory, Wechsler is right; in practice, how-
ever, there seems to be a tendency for the perspectives of a congressman to
change once in Washington, from concern for state interest to national con-
cerns. Perhaps this is as it should be, but it does not make Congress a very
effective restraint on the exercise of congressional (its own) power.
With respect to concerns of individual freedom, congressional power to
reach private conduct is of great concern. Regardless of whether one favors
congressional intervention in particular private matters, it must be borne in
mind that such intervention does limit individual liberty. One may counter
that the liberty to be a bigot and act in a discriminatory manner is not worth
having. Perhaps it is and perhaps it is not. The fact remains that freedom of
action is restrained. The topic of individual freedom will be dealt with more
extensively below;95 for the moment it will suffice to identify areas of possi-
ble congressional intervention.
Congress might, for example, attempt to regulate all forms of private
discrimination, including such practices as private club membership, al-
though in such a case constitutional concerns of associational freedom would
probably serve as a limit.96 Congress might also impose upon private em-
ployers obligations of due process toward their employees with regard to
such matters as promotion and termination. Also, the Runyon v. MCray
97
rationale might be applied through the fourteenth amendment to reach sex
discrimination in private schools receiving no federal aid.98 Although un-
likely, Congress might go so far as to determine that corporal punishment of
children violates the children's civil rights and outlaw spanking, as Sweden
did. Again, of course, constitutional concerns of family autonomy and pri-
vacy would be raised.99
Another result of an expansive view of congressional power to define the
substance of fourteenth amendment guarantees is the bill now pending
before Congress stating that "human life shall be deemed to exist from con-
ception" and that the term "person" in the fourteenth amendment "shall
include all human life as defined herein." 100 The bill, expressly based upon
section 5, contains a finding that "present day scientific evidence indicates a
significant likelihood that actual human life exists from conception."10 1 The
purpose of the bill is, of course, to get around the holding in Roe v. Wade 102
94. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States n the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
95. See text accompanying notes 194-232 in/a.
96. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
97. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
98. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 243.
99. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
100. S. 158, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. S. 287-88 (Jan. 19, 1981).
101. Id
102. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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forbidding states from banning abortions in most circumstances. Such a
measure would not only permit states to restrict access to abortions, it would
also, presumably, prohibit any state funding of abortions and perhaps require
states to ban abortions, or at least give Congress the power to prohibit abor-
tions nationwide.
Proponents of the Human Life Bill argue that the determination of
when life begins is a matter for which Congress is more suited than are the
courts.'0 3 In Wade, the Court declined to decide when human life begins,
but stated that the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment does not
include the unborn. The bill reflects one of the major difficulties with the
"ratchet theory."' 4 It is far from clear in the case of this bill which way the
ratchet is turning. It is true that the "privacy right" of a woman to abort a
fetus she is carrying would be restricted. At the same time, however, Con-
gress would be extending fourteenth amendment protections to a whole new
class of "persons." If, as Justice Brennan stated in Morgan, it is Congress'
prerogative to weigh competing considerations and that all that is necessary
to sustain congressional action under section 5 is "a basis upon which Con-
gress might predicate its judgment,"' 10 5 there is no principled reason to deny
Congress power in this area. If the bill passes, the Court will have to face
squarely the question of whether Congress has wide latitude in determining
the scope of fourteenth amendment rights when it seeks to advance liberal
causes, but a much narrower latitude in advancing conservative causes.
IV. EQUALITY AND LIBERTY
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren't
only equal before God and the law. They were equal every which
way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better
looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker than
anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and
213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigi-
lance of the United States Handicapper General.106
A. Equality and Liberty Defmed
Most of the attempts to expand congressional enforcement power under
the Civil War amendments have been attempts to assure greater "equality."
It is the thesis of the remainder of this article that the quest for greater equal-
ity has become a national obsession, at least among policy makers, and an
expansive reading of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment
poses very real dangers. Moreover, current conceptions of equality are far
removed from the notion of equality around which this country was formed.
The modern concept of equality, rather than being a necessary complement
to liberty, has become its antithesis. Finally, the quest for greater equality
103. Galebach, A Human Lift Statute, HUMAN LIFE REV. (Winter 1980), repnnted ih Cong.
Rec. S. 288 (Jan. 19, 1981).
104. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
106. K. VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 8 (1968).
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carries with it tremendous costs to society, costs which should be considered
in the decision-making process.
In his classic reflections on American society, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed:
Democratic nations are at all times fond of equality, but there
are certain epochs at which the passion they entertain for it swells
to the height of fury. This occurs at the moment when the old
social system, long menaced, is overthrown after a severe intestine
struggle, and the barriers of rank are at length thrown down. At
such times, men pounce upon equality as their booty, and they
cling to it as to some precious treasure which they fear to lose. The
passion for equality penetrates on every side into men's hearts, ex-
pands there, and fills them entirely. Tell them not that, by this
blind surrender of themselves to an exclusive passion, they risk
their dearest interests: they are deaf. Show them not freedom es-
caping from their grasp whilst they are looking another way: they
are blind, or, rather, they can discern but one object to be desired
in the universe.
I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for
freedom: left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view
any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is
ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible: they call for equality in
freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality
in slavery. They will endure poverty, servitude, barbarism; but
they will not endure aristocracy.10 7
We are in such an epoch today. Tremendous attention and resources are
marshalled to achieve the goal of equality; every decision is examined to
ensure that it will have no disparate impact upon any group, at least any
"protected" group.
Equality and liberty are the two cornerstones of this country. The Dec-
laration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-
suit of Happiness."' 0 8 Depending upon one's definition of the terms "Lib-
erty" and "Equality," these two values may come into conflict. If they do,
which is to prevail?
There are two major formulations of the concept of liberty or freedom.
One is the "negative" form, or "freedom from"; the other is the "positive"
form, or "freedom to."' 0 9 Under the negative formulation, a person is free
to the extent that no person or group of persons interferes with his activity.
Helvetius described a free man as one "who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in
a gaol, nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment. . . it is not lack
of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale."" 10 The essence of
107. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191-92 (1842).
108. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776.
109. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, repnnted in I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122
(1969). See alo Muller, The Meanings of Freedom, in H. MULLER, ISSUES OF FREEDOM 3 (1960).
110. Quotedin I. BERLIN, supra note 109, at 122 n.2.
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the negative form of liberty is that all coercion is inherently bad, although
coercion may have to be applied to restrain other, greater evils; and, while
non-interference is inherently good, it is not the only good."1 '
Under the "positive" form, or "freedom to," a person is free to the ex-
tent that he is his own master. 1 2 Bertrand Russell defined freedom as "the
absence of obstacles to the realization of desires." ' 1 3 This absence of obsta-
cles includes obstacles other than merely restraints by other people. The
essence of the distinction between the negative and the positive forms is that
the latter entails thepower to achieve the objective that one chooses. Those
who maintain that the positive form is the only true freedom argue that
whether one is restrained from achieving goals by external restraints im-
posed by other people, or for any other reason, such as lack of economic
power, the result is the same; therefore, the only realistic view of freedom is
that it is the possibility of meaningful choice.
The distinction between the two forms of freedom reflect the distinction
between the concept of "right" and the concept of "power." In response to
the question of whether a pauper has the freedom to buy a new car, one who
believes in the negative form of freedom will respond in the affirmative, be-
cause the pauper has the right to buy the car on the same terms as anyone
else; it is irrelevant that he does not have the economic power. One who
subscribes to the positive definition will respond to the question in the nega-
tive, because the pauper does not have thepower to buy the car; his theoreti-
cal right to buy it is irrelevant.
Opposing views in Hams v. McRae 114 also demonstrate the difference
between the two forms of freedom. McRae involved the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which severely restricted federal
funding of abortions. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated that the
statute was constitutional because it "places no governmental obstacles in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy ... . In a
statement clearly expressing the negative form of freedom, Justice Stewart
stated that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
creation. "116
Justice Brennan, dissenting, stated that "the Hyde Amendment not
only was designed to inhibit, but does in fact inhibit, the woman's freedom
to choose abortion over childbirth."' ' 7 This statement represents the posi-
tive view of freedom. Strictly speaking, of course, the Hyde Amendment
does not restrict a woman's freedom to choose an abortion, it merely restricts
her power to pay for it.
It appears that Justice Brennan's primary objection to the amendment
is that because Medicaid pays for childbirth but not for abortion, the state is
111. Id at 161.
112. Id at 131.
113. Qyotd tn H. MULLER supra note 109, at 9.
114. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
115. Id at 315.
116. Id at 316.
117. Id at 332.
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"wielding its enormous power and influence in a manner that might burden
the pregnant woman's freedom to choose whether to have an abortion."'' 8
It is true that to an indigent woman the Hyde Amendment serves to make
the childbirth alternative more attractive economically than the abortion
alternative. It is also true, however, that the maintenance of a public school
system makes the public schooling alternative more attractive economically
than the private schooling alternative, despite the fact that parents have a
constitutional right to send their children to private schools." 9 That does
not mean that the state has a constitutional duty to pay for private
schooling.
It is not difficult to understand the difference between the two defini-
tions of liberty, or to realize that each has some validity. The difficulty lies
in deciding which form of liberty it is that our government is to guarantee. I
would argue that it is the negative form. The Declaration of Independence
best characterizes the freedom: "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness"-not "Life, Liberty and Happiness"; or "Life, Liberty and the achieve-
ment of Happiness." The philosophers of the Western liberal tradition, out
of which this country grew, viewed the institution of government as a crea-
ture of a "social compact,"' 2 0 and believed that governments "deriv[e their
just powers from the consent of the governed."'12 1 For the Founders, free-
dom was considered to be the natural state, with the voluntary surrender by
the people of a certain amount of freedom in favor of security. Government
might be the protector of liberty, but it certainly was not the grantor of
liberty. Those who view freedom in its positive form view it as something to
be granted by the government, a view quite different from the idea of liberty
embodied in the Declaration of Independence.
Whether one accepts the positive or negative form of freedom, one con-
clusion is inescapable: the two forms of freedom are incompatible. Either
form, of course, in its purest sense is theoretically impossible. There cannot
be a complete absence of restraint on everyone; people being what they are,
one group will try to take advantage of another group by restraining them in
some way. If that is permitted to happen, the latter group is less free; if it is
not permitted, the former group is less free. Similarly, under the positive
definition of freedom, everyone cannot be given the power to achieve all of
his goals-people want too much. By giving one person the power to
achieve his desired ends, it is generally necessary to restrain someone else.
Merely because pure absolute freedom under either definition is not an
achievable goal, however, does not mean that freedom is not desirable or
that one form is not superior to the other.
Just as there are diametrically opposed definitions of "liberty," there are
equally conflicting definitions of the term "equality," the two forms being
"equality of opportunity" and "equality of result." 122 The concept of equal-
118. Id at 330.
119. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
120. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
121. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776.
122. See M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 128-149 (1980).
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ity of opportunity embraces the proposition that no one should be prevented
for arbitrary reasons from using his capacities to pursue his own objectives.
Everyone can enter the race, but some are more likely to win. Equality of
opportunity does not mean an equal probability of success; it means an
equal amount of external restraints.
The "New Equality," equality of result, means something entirely dif-
ferent. To return to the metaphor of the race, it .means that everyone has an
equal probability of winning, or more commonly, that every "protected"
group-whether it be defined by gender, race or national origin-is propor-
tionately represented in the class of "winners." Those who favor this defini-
tion of equality argue that it is unrealistic to have "shackled" someone-or
someone of his group, as there is little concern that the particular individual
who receives the edge was ever the victim of discrimination himself12 3 -and
then to let him out of the shackles and expect him to compete equally.1 24
The goal of equality of result, however, extends beyond the remedy of past
discrimination, and is considered a principle that should be reflected in all
aspects of society. James Fenimore Cooper reflected on the two forms of
equality almost a century-and-a-half ago:
Equality, in a social sense, may be divided into that of condition,
and that of rights. Equality of condition is incompatible with civi-
lization, and is found only to exist in those communities that are
but slightly removed from the savage state. In practice, it can only
mean a common misery. 125
An example of the difference in the two philosophies may be helpful.
One who subscribes to the "equality of opportunity" definition would argue
that a black child from a poor family where education is not valued has the
same opportunity to go to Harvard as does a white child from a well-to-do
family where education is stressed. That is, Harvard is not going to refuse
the poor applicant admission anymore merely because he is black, or be-
cause he does not come from the "right kind of family," or any other arbi-
trary reason. It may, however, refuse him because of his inadequate
academic achievement, but that does not reflect a lack of equality. The re-
sponse to that assertion by the advocates of the New Equality is that regard-
less of whether Harvard's decision is based upon arbitrary or rational
criteria, the fact remains that the poor child does not have the same
probability of success. That is true, but that conclusion does not necessarily
mean that government should intervene in order to "equalize."
The case of City of Rome v. United States, discussed above, 126 reflects an
acquiescence by the Court in a congressional policy embodying the concept
of equality of result.. In City of Rome, it will be remembered, Congress was
deemed to have the power to block a change in voting practices that might
123. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Some critics of the New Equality argue that for the proponents of the New Equality, it
is the race itself that is evil. See Jaffa, Equality as a Conservaive Pnn)citpe, Review of W. KENDALL &
G. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, 8 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 471 (1975).
125. J. COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT 36 (1838).
126. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). See text accompanying notes 71-78 supra.
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result in fewer blacks being elected in Rome, Georgia. If equality of oppor-
tunity were being guaranteed, the Court would determine only whether
blacks were unfairly being denied access to the ballot or the ballot box. In-
stead, the Court guaranteed equality of result by allowing Congress to en-
sure that minority groups could be represented in public office in proportion
to their numbers in the population. Implicit in this decision is the assump-
tion that race is a legitimate criterion by which to evaluate candidates.
There remains the question of whether equality of result is the kind of
equality that was intended to be guaranteed by those whose ideas are repre-
sented in the Civil War amendments. Probably there is no better way to
answer this question than by looking to the words of Abraham Lincoln, who,
in his Gettysburg Address, stated that our nation was "conceived in Liberty,
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.' 27 In
1857, he stated:
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration of
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not in-
tend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to
say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or
social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what
respects they did consider all men created equal--equal with "cer-
tain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness." This they said, and this they meant.1 28
These are not the words of a man seeking equality of result or reward. Lin-
coln was not arguing for a change in the social order to ensure an equal
position for the Negro, but a change in the legal order to ensure that the
same law would apply to the black man as applied to the white man. The
equality that Lincoln sought was equality of opportunity.
B. Can Liberty and Equality Coexist?
Now that the terms "liberty" and "equality" have been defined, it is
instructive to consider a classic question in political philosophy: Are equal-
ity and liberty compatible, or are they necessarily antithetical? The answer
to this question depends upon the definitions of the terms chosen.
The negative form of freedom ("freedom from") and equality of result
are not compatible because, in order to ensure equality of result, the govern-
ment must necessarily impose external restraints on some people, and to that
extent their freedom of action is impaired. The government cannot ensure a
given outcome without in some way arbitrarily restraining someone else-
whether it is by redistributing wealth or by conferring other advantages.
The freedom of action of the person whose money is taken, or the person
who would have occupied the spot which has been assured to the other per-
son by the government, has been restrained. Equality of result is therefore
impossible because it cannot accompany equal freedom.
For the same reason, the positive form of freedom and equality of result
127. Address by President Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Gettysburg, Pa. November 19, 1863).
128. A. Lincoln, Address Delivered at Springfield, Illnoir, June 26, 1857, in THE IDEA OF
EQUALITY: AN ANTHOLOGY 185 (G. Abernethy ed. 1959).
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are also incompatible, or at least compatible only to a limited extent. They
are compatible only insofar as the desire for a given outcome coincides with
the outcome that the government deigns to bestow. A necessary feature of a
system that guarantees equality of outcome is the presence of a "master
planner" who decides what outcomes are to be protected. Equality of result
does not mean that any particular results are guaranteed; it means only that
the results are to be granted or denied equally. One might desire success,
but "success" generally connotes a level of" achievement beyond that
achieved by others. Under a system where equality of result is guaranteed,
the freedom to be successful is denied.
One might, at first blush, expect that "freedom to" and equality of op-
portunity would be compatible. "Freedom to," however, presupposes that
those who lack the means to achieve their goals will gain some form of aid to
achieve them. Generally, this cannot be achieved without some form of re-
straint on others, and this restraint is unequal. Since equality of opportunity
involves equality of external restraint, "freedom to" and equality of opportu-
nity cannot coexist. Moreover, to the extent that one person's "freedom to"
is granted, another's may be impaired.
"Freedom from" and equality of opportunity are compatible; in fact,
they are two sides of the same coin. When these two values coexist, everyone
enjoys the same absence of external restraint. These are the forms of liberty
and equality embodied in such documents as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Gettysburg Address. No one is assured of attaining a particu-
lar status in society, but everyone has the opportunity to try. One group of
society is not subject to different laws than is another group. One is not
guaranteed a position in society because of an ascribed status such as noble
birth, gender, or race; nor is anyone excluded from a position on these
grounds. When the government goes beyond the guarantee of "freedom
from" and equality of opportunity, every step it takes makes us less free. As
Thomas Jefferson observed: "The natural progress of things is for liberty to
yield and government to gain ground." 29 The question then becomes: to
what extent and with what fervor do we oppose this natural trend? Are we
willing to make equality the supreme end in itself and sacrifice liberty to
achieve it?
C. The National Obsession with Equality
The "reverse discrimination" cases are the clearest reflection of the
trend in this country toward the deification of equality. Equality has be-
come the new religion among policymakers. 130 If this were equality of op-
portunity there should be little cause for concern. Unfortunately, it is
equality of result, the goal of which is to achieve proportional representation
129. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to E. Carrington (May 27, 1788), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (A. Koch & W. Pedersen eds.).
130. It should be pointed out that studies show that a majority of both blacks and whites
oppose affirmative action. Bolce & Gray, Blacks, Whites and "Race Politts", 54 PuB. INTEREST 61
(1979). Of course, the phrasing of the question would probably have a significant impact on the
distribution of responses.
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of selected groups in all things; not equality among individuals, but among
classes, reflecting a shift "from equality of prospective opportunity toward
statistical parity of retrospective results."'' The desire of contemporary
populists for wholesale egalitarianism is "not for fairness, but against ehtism;
its impulse is not justice, but ressentiment."132 .. To the extent that equality is
seen as an element of justice, it is seen as the only element of justice;13 3 the
term "meritocracy" is derided as "elitism."
It is not the purpose of this article to delve deeply into the "reverse
discrimination" cases; a brief synopsis of them is enough to show the ascen-
dancy of the concept of the New Equality in the Supreme Court. In Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,i14 the Court ratified preferential admis-
sions programs in universities, so long as the programs do not involve quotas.
That is, even without a showing of past discrimination by the institution, the
institution may weigh the applicant's race in its admission decision. The
holding of the Court means that as long as the goal of the program is equal-
ity of result, traditional constitutional principles forbidding state-sponsored
racial discrimination are to be ignored.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 1 35 the Court held that an affirmative ac-
tion program that reserved fifty percent of the openings in a company train-
ing program did not violate Title VII, solely because the effect of the plan
was to achieve equality of result in the plant workforce. In order to reach
that result, the Court was willing to ignore the plain meaning of the statute,
as well as relatively unambiguous legislative history. 136
More recently, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,i 3 7 the Court upheld a provision
of the Public Works Employment Act of 19 77 138 that required at least ten
percent of federal funds granted for public works projects to be used to pro-
cure services or supplies from minority business enterprises. Despite the fact
that Congress had made no findings that there had been any prior discrimi-
nation in federal contracting, the Court was "satisfied that Congress had
abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional pro-
curement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate
the effects of prior discrimination."' 13 9 Again, the common thread running
through all these decisions is that the extent of protection that one has
against racial discrimination depends upon one's race, for in the name of
equality the Court is willing to extend constitutional protections unequally.
The above-described cases reflect a trend toward a return to pre-emi-
nence of the ascribed status that the architects of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Civil War amendments intended to eliminate. Indeed, it
was not Lewis Carroll but a United States Supreme Court Justice who de-
131. Sowell, Weber and Bakke, and the Presupposdiotns of "AJimative Action", 26 WAYNE L.
REV. 1309, 1312 (1980).
132. Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INTEREST 29, 65 (1972).
133. See Votaw, The New Equality: Bureaucracy's Trojan Horse, 20 CAL. MAN. REV. 5 (1978).
134. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
135. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
136. See text accompanying notes 181-189 inyia.
137. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (Supp. I 1979).
139. Id at 2775 (emphasis added).
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clared that "in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."
140
The reverse discrimination cases demonstrate graphically the incompat-
ibility of equality of result and liberty; the means by which equality is ob-
tained is by restricting the liberty of others. In order to achieve statistical
parity, external restraints are placed upon some competitors solely upon the
basis of an ascribed status.
The national obsession with equality is vividly illustrated by a report
entitled Sex B&s in the US Code, 14 1 a report prepared under contract for the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. The purpose of the 230-page
report was to identify and analyze sex-based references in the Code. 142 The
report makes a number of recommendations. For example, the words "man-
kind," "manpower," "paternity," "manmade," "midshipman,; and "he"
should be eliminated from the Code and, presumably (if we have any social
conscience), from our vocabularies as well. These words are to be replaced
by "humankind," "human resources," "parentage," "artificial," "midship-
person," and "he/she,"' 143 respectively. It was also recommended that a fe-
male counterpart to "Johnny Horizon," the anti-litter symbol, be created. 144
While reading the report, one conjures up a mental image of the authors of
the report channeling all their energies toward the exclusive goal of becom-
ing offended. It seems that such a concentration on trivialities demeans le-
gitimate claims of sexual inequality and does little more than invite ridicule
of the women's movement in general.
V. COSTS OF THE NATIONAL OBSESSION WITH EQUALITY
The achievement of the New Equality is not without social costs, but
those who favor such equality may be willing to pay them (and make those
who do not favor it pay them as well). It is far from clear, however, whether
those who value this equality so highly have considered how much must be
given up to achieve it. These costs are associated not only with congressional
actions under the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments, but
also with actions of the judicial and executive branches. The costs of the
policy may be categorized as economic costs, social costs, institutional costs,
and political costs, with, of course, much overlap in the categories.
A. Economic Costs
Perhaps least important, but nonetheless substantial, are the economic
costs of the all-pervasive national obsession with equality. Surely, if equality
140. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
141. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE (1977).
142. Id at 2.
143. Id. at 15-16. Efforts to purge the language of allegedly "sexist" terms have not been
limited to the public sector. Roget's Thesaurus has banned "male chauvinist" terms from its
new edition, replacing such words as "mankind" and "countryman" with "humankind" and
"country dweller," respectively. Rocky Mountain News, April 11, 1982, at 2. There has been
no announcement about whether such terms as "nigger," "jungle bunny," and "jigaboo," which
appear in the 1977 edition, have been found equally inappropriate.
144. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 141, at 102.
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is the transcendent value some feel it is, it is difficult to complain that it costs
too much money. When it comes to liberty, for example, few would argue
that it is not worth the price. Certainly the massive defense budget suggests
that, for many, liberty is worth whatever price must be paid for it. t 45 But
what about equality? People may reach different conclusions about its
value, but everyone should realize that it is costing us dearly. It is impossible
to determine precisely how much is spent in the quest for equality; we do not
yet have a Department of Equality, whose budget may be scrutinized care-
fully by cost accountants. The costs of equality are diffused throughout soci-
ety; in this respect the situation differs from defense spending, which is done
primarily by the federal government.
The government spends a great deal of money on many kinds of equal-
ity-oriented programs. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department, as well as divisions in each cabi-
net department, all spend millions of dollars promulgating and monitoring
such programs. There are also hidden costs, such as the payment of higher
contracting fees to minority contractors because they are, to an extent, ex-
empt from competitive bidding requirements.
1 46
In addition to direct spending by the government are sums spent in the
private sector to comply with the edicts of the government. For example, it
is estimated that in the years 1974-78 business paid more than one billion
dollars in back pay awards, promotion, and training directly related to
achieving equality, and that does not include the money spent on legal fees,
changes in personnel systems, and the like.1 47 It also does not include the
massive sums spent by business to comply with government reporting
requirements.
Schools and universities are in much the same situation as business. It
has been estimated that the cost to colleges and universities of complying
with federal hiring and admission requirements has been over two billion
dollars.1 48  It is estimated that compliance with federal regulations at
Harvard alone consumed 60,000 hours of faculty time in academic year
1974-75,'49 and the University of Michigan spent $350,000 just to compile
statistics in connection with affirmative action programs.1 5 0 It is also esti-
mated that between 1976 and 1980 schools and school districts spent almost
800,000 man-hours completing Office for Civil Rights questionnaires. 15 1
145. Even most of those who do not favor massive defense spending oppose such spending
because they feel that it is not necessary for the preservation of our liberties.
146. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
147. Tamarkin, Is Equal Opportuniy Turning into a Witchhunt?, FORBES, May 29, 1978, at 29.
The Fortune 500 companies spend close to $1,000,000,000 per year on routine compliance activ-
ities alone. Seligman, AJ'omatioe Action is Here to Stay, 105 FORTUNE 143, 156 (April 19, 1982).
148. Note, Title IX Sex Dicrimination Regulations: Impact on Pnate Education, 65 KY. L.J. 656
(1977) (hereinafter cited as Sex Discriiiation Regulations).
149. Id
150. Sowell, Affrmateio Action Reconsidered, 42 PUB. INTEREST 47, 57 (1976).
151. Oversight Hearing on Paperwork Control Amendmnenti: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Elmentaqy Secondary and Vocational Education of the House Coamm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 46 (1979).
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These requirements involve tremendous sums of money.
The irony of these massive expenditures to achieve proportional repre-
sentation is that in addition to being inefficient they may be counterproduc-
tive as well. One is reminded of Jos& Ortega y Gasset's observation that
"[tihe mob goes in search of bread, and the means it employs is generally to
wreck the bakeries."' 15 2 Where equal representation, rather than efficiency,
becomes the goal of the national economy, large sums of money are chan-
neled into non-productive activities, which may have a stagnating effect on
the economy.15 3 Since, in the past, a growing economy was available to
allow immigrants to become assimilated, the very practices used in an at-
tempt to achieve equality may make its achievement impossible. This is a
classic example of the fable of the goose that laid the golden egg-a system
may, at its own pace, be capable of producing the desired result, but at-
tempts to speed up the system are doomed to failure.
154
B. Social Costs
1. Mediocrity
Tremendous social costs are also associated with the drive for equality,
not least of which is the demonstration of the truth of John Stuart Mill's
observation that "the general tendency of things throughout the world is to
render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind."' 155 Mediocrity is
inevitable in a system that values proportional representation over
excellence.
Perhaps the trend toward mediocrity is nowhere more observable than
in the field of education. Even some who favor the Bakke decision acknowl-
edge that there will be some decline in average educational standards, "per-
haps an appreciable reduction."' 156 When equality of opportunity was the
accepted standard, the expectation was that excellence was the ultimate ob-
jective and that superior achievement would be rewarded. 157 Yet, when
standards for admission are lowered, there is pressure also to lower expecta-
tions, for otherwise there is the very real possibility that those for whom the
standards were lowered will fail at proportionately higher rates. An example
of the decline in expectations that accompanies a decrease in admission stan-
dards is shown by changes in grading policies at George Washington Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C. Prior to the early 1970's, George Washington
required as a condition of graduation a cumulative 2.0 overall grade point
average (GPA) and a 2.5 GPA in the major field-hardly a stringent re-
152. J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, REVOLT OF THE MASSES 60 (1932).
153. Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Rediributhng Injistice, 21 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1979).
154. George Gilder has observed that "[ulpward mobility is at least partly dependent on
upward admiration: on an accurate perception of the nature of the contest and a respect for the
previous winners of it." G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 99 (1981). As long as people are
encouraged to believe that the contest is inherently unfair, there is little incentive to participate
in it. The result is that the only upward mobility comes from an increase in government lar-
gesse, and the contest is transformed into a race for a favored position at the federal trough.
155. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 62 (1859).
156. Griswold, The Bakke Probem-Allocation of &arce Resources in Education and Otler Areas,
1979 WASH. U.L. Q. 55, 69.
157. Id at 68.
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quirement in a day when the average grade was a "B." In the early 1970's,
however, the administration decided that since the school was admitting
"C" students it was "unfair" to require anything more than "C" work from
them. Consequently, the major GPA requirement was lowered to 2.0.158
Those who favor affirmative action argue that it does not require that
unqualified applicants be accepted, only that a minority in the "qualified"
pool be given precedence over a qualified non-minority. This argument is
misleading, however, because applicants do not fall into one of two discrete,
internally homogeneous groups-either "qualified" or "not qualified."
Within the group of applicants labelled "qualified," there are those who are
more qualified and those who are less qualified. A characteristic complaint
about the Department of Education is that "they do not make allowances for
quality judgments, appearing to regard the Ph.D. simply as being in the
same category as a machinist's union card." 1 59 To illustrate that simply la-
belling applicants as either "qualified" or "not qualified" is inadequate, one
need only consider the case of Allan Bakke, rejected from the medical school
at the University of California at Davis in favor of sixteen "qualified" minor-
ity students. Bakke had a GPA of 3.46 and Medical College Admissions Test
(MCAT) scores in the ninetieth percentile, while the average GPA of the
accepted minorities was a 2.75 and their average MCAT score was in the
thirty-second percentile. 16 0 Surely just to call them all "qualified" is not to
tell the whole story.
Another example of a willingness to accept mediocrity in order to attain
proportional representation is the change in the pass rate of the Penn-
sylvania bar examination. From 1955 to 1970, only 83 of 306 (27%) blacks
who took the state bar exam passed, compared with 7300 of 10,790 (68%)
whites. 1 6t In order to pass more blacks, the overall pass rate was increased to
85-98% in the years 1971 to 1975, thereby raising the pass rate for blacks to
about 60%.162
An unanswered question is at what point do we stop accepting subcom-
petence? We can admit students into college who would not otherwise be
considered qualified and take extraordinary measures to keep them in; we
can admit students into professional schools who would not otherwise be
considered qualified and take more extraordinary measures to keep them in;
and we can admit students into professions who would not otherwise be con-
sidered qualified. Do we then take extraordinary measures to keep them in
their professions? Is it "fair" to apply the same standards of professional
competence, or do we adopt separate malpractice standards for people who
were admitted under affirmative action programs? At what point do we stop
considering abstract notions of fairness and recognize that society has a
158. The author attended George Washington University from 1972 to 1975.
159. Letter from Carleton Whitehead, Affirmative Action Compliance Officer at Reed Col-
lege, Portland, Ore., cited in Sex Disermtnatton Regulations, supra note 148.
160. 438 U.S. at 277-78 n.7. The figures quoted are composites of the two years that Bakke
applied.
161. Symposium, The Minority Candidate and the Bar Examination, 5 BLACK L.J. 119 (1976).
162. Id New Mexico has also recently raised its pass rate in order to raise the pass rate of
minorities. Winter, N.M. Lowers Bar Exam Pass Score- Sparks Protest, 67 A.B.A.J. 1438 (1981).
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strong interest in having the standards of competence set as high as possible?
In the words of John Sparrow, "excellence may not be a matter for pride,
but it is never a matter for regret."' 63
Perhaps the supreme irony is the selectivity with which people decide
when to accept mediocrity. A decision to require proportional representa-
tion of whites-on a professional basketball team would be satirized through-
out the lan'd. Why? Well, obviously, one should be selected for a sports
team on the ability to play the sport, that is, on the basis of merit. Yet
requirements that certain groups be represented in certain proportions in
higher education receive more support. Does competence matter less in a
doctor than in a professional basketball player? Those who favor affirmative
action argue that it is acceptable to admit to professional schools those who
are objectively less qualified, because the objective criteria (for example,
GPA, Law School Admissions Test [LSAT], or MCAT) used to select stu-
dents do not predict how good a doctor or a lawyer one will be, even though
they may accurately predict academic success. That argument proves too
much. If the objective criteria are irrational they should not be applied to
anyone; in fact, if they are irrational, their use by state schools is
unconstitutional.
Mediocrity also brings with it economic costs, for when irrelevant crite-
ria such as sex or race are preferred to efficiency in a job, it takes more
people to do the same amount of work, either because a less competent per-
son works more slowly, or because he makes more mistakes that need correc-
tion. Consequently, productivity declines.
2. Loss of Individualism
Another great social cost associated with what Daniel Boorstin has
called "Intergenerational Bookkeeping"' 164 is the change in the traditional
liberal view of individualism and a return to consideration of people as
members of a group. The concept of equality of opportunity derives from
two basic tenets of classic liberalism-that the individual, and not the fam-
ily, community, or state, is the basic unit of society, and that the purpose of
society is to allow the individual the freedom to seek his own goals. 16 5
Equality of opportunity and the classic liberalism deny the precedence of
birth or any other criterion that determines position, other than competition,
the outcome of which is determined by talent, ambition, and luck. ' 66
Individualism is losing its importance in our society. No longer are we
considered individual actors in our dealings with the state (and each other);
we are considered merely as representatives of our race, ethnic group, or
gender. Perhaps, to paraphrase Justice Blackmun in Bakke,' 6 7 to treat peo-
163. J. SPARROW, Too MUCH OF A GOOD THING (1977).
164. D. BOORSTIN, THE SOCIOLOGy OF THE ABSURD (1970).
165. Bell, supra note 132. Se also J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HIs-
TORY at x (1978).
166. See Bell, supra note 132.
167. 438 U.S. at 407. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
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ple as individuals we must ignore their individual qualities and treat them
according to which group they represent.
Loss of individualism is another area where current conceptions differ
drastically from the principles around which this country was formed. Al-
though the founders were not egalitarians in the sense of being levelers (as
were the architects of the French Revolution), they were egalitarians in the
sense that they believed that people were to be treated the same under the
law without regard to birth or social station.1 68 The trend in modern society
is to go back to a state where legal relations depend upon membership in a
group.
3. Devaluation of Minority Accomplishment
In a sense, the saddest aspect of affirmative action is the devaluation of
true accomplishment by minorities, because the victims are the intended
beneficiaries of the programs. Even though many members of minority
groups would have succeeded without affirmative action, a common pre-
sumption today is that a minority person who succeeds does so because he
had help not available to others.
Thomas Sowell points out that black income as a percentage of white
income reached its peak in 1970-the year before the implementation of
"goals and timetables," though the percentage has since decreased. 169 He
argues that sociological "explanations" offered by white liberals and black
"spokesmen" to explain why blacks cannot pull themselves up the way other
oppressed minorities have in the past miss the mark, because the fact is that
blacks have pulled themselves up-from further down and against stronger
opposition-and they show every indication of continuing to advance. This
advancement, he argues, would have continued even without affirmative ac-
tion; all affirmative action has done is to destroy the legitimacy of what has
already been achieved.
Another way in which minorities are harmed by affirmative action is by
the shunting of minorities into certain kinds of jobs. For example, in faculty
hiring in colleges and universities, employers are faced with opposing sets of
incentives. By hiring from the government-designated groups, an employer's
short-run liabilities are lowered, but his long-run liabilities are increased be-
cause employees from designated groups can subject the employer to addi-
tional costs whenever their pay, promotion, or discharge patterns deviate
from those favored by government agencies. In faculty hiring programs,
these considerations can be significant because of "up or out" policies of try-
ing out new faculty and either renewing their contracts and perhaps eventu-
ally granting them tenure, or letting them go. The effect has been to reduce
demand for untested members of minority groups, raise demand for better
qualified members of such groups, and shift members of minority groups out
168. Thomas Jefferson wrote: "The foundation upon which all our constitutions are built is
the natural equality of man, the denial of every preeminence but that annexed to legal office,
and particularly the denial of a preeminence by birth." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
George Washington (1784).
169. Sowell, supra note 150.
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of faculty and into admi iisi ration where "up or out" policies do not apply.
These predictions are borne out by empirical evidence that: 1) blacks with-
out doctorates and having few publications earn less than similarly situated
whites; 2) blacks with Ph.D.'s from top schools and having several publica-
tions earned more than comparable whites; and 3) there is a higher propor-
tion of blacks in administrative positions than would be expected.170
Adverse impacts on minority students are also observable. For example,
at Cornell University in the early 1970's, half of all black students were on
academic probation. It is not that they were incapable of good academic
performance; their scores were in the upper twenty-five percent of all stu-
dents admitted to college, but the Cornell student body as a whole was in the
upper one percent. 171
The obverse of the devaluation of minority accomplishment is the built-
in excuse that affirmative action provides for those non-minorities who do
not succeed: they are encouraged to believe that their failure was due to
government-mandated affirmative action, rather than to some deficiency on
their part.' 72 In addition to sowing the seeds of race hatred, the end result is
that it becomes too difficult for minorities to take credit for their genuine
accomplishment and too easy for non-minorities to escape responsibility for
their genuine failure. ' 7
3
C. lnstitutional Costs
Perhaps the greatest institutional cost is the conversion of what was
once thought to be a government of laws, not men, into a government of
men. When the integrity of the judicial and political processes is made
subordinate to a given social goal, good or bad, we cannot reasonably expect
respect for our governmental institutions to survive.
The greatest perversions of constitutional principle have probably come
from the judiciary, with the administrative bureaucracy not far behind.
Congress has been far from blameless, but more restrained due to the nature
of the institution. Chief Justice Burger has warned:
What Cardozo tells us is beware the "good result," achieved by
judicially unauthorized or intellectually dishonest means on the
appealing notion that the desirable ends justify the improper judi-
cial means. For there is always the danger. that the seeds of prece-
dent sown by good men for the best of motives will yield a rich
harvest of unprincipled acts of others also aiming at "good
ends." ' 7 4
Complaints that the Court is rewriting the Constitution or sitting as a
continuing constitutional convention are usually met with the somewhat
condescending reminder that "it is a constitution we are expounding."'' 75
170. Id
171. Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
172. Walker, supra note 153.
173. Sowell, supra note 150.
174. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in the original).
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That rather facile reminder is intended to calm any fears one might have
that the Court is acting in an improper manner when it construes the Consti-
tution in a way that runs counter to the intent of the framers (to the extent
that intent can be determined). Surely, it zs a constitution that is being ex-
pounded, and surely it should not have the prolixity of a legal code, and
surely situations arise which were not within the contemplation of the fram-
ers. When such unforeseen occurrences arise, however, the Court should not
then consider the constitutional provision a tabula rasa on which it may scrib-
ble according to its sense of what is wise social policy. Moreover, the
"amendment" of the Constitution by the judiciary is wholly out of keeping
with the spirit of article V of the Constitution, which makes constitutional
amendments rather difficult to pass. The argument that it is because of the
difficulty of the amending process that five of nine justices on the Supreme
Court have the right or obligation to change the meaning of the Constitu-
tion from the meaning it was originally intended to have is incompatible
with the amending process as originally conceived. The reason for requiring
ratification by three-fourths of the states was precisely to "guard. . .against
that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable."1 76
A look at two landmark cases in fourteenth amendment construction-
Brown v. Board of Education 177 and Reynolds v. Sims, 178 both of which brought
new meaning to the fourteenth amendment-may be instructive. Arguably,
Brown is supportable using a historic approach. Although the framers of the
amendment did not intend the fourteenth amendment to outlaw segregated
schools, 179 the greatly increased importance of public schools in our society
may justify a change in the law. On the other hand, Reynolds v. Sims is im-
possible to reconcile with the intent of the framers. As discussed above,' 8 0
one of the very few clear principles that can be derived from the legislative
history of the amendment is that it was not intended to apply to voting; not
only did the framers not intend the amendment to apply to voting, they
intended it not to apply. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the importance
of voting had changed so much between the 1860's and the 1960's as to
justify the Court's departure from historical principles. Regardless of
whether one feels that the "one man, one vote" policy required by Reynolds is
wise social policy, it cannot be gainsaid that the route by which this policy
was achieved was harmful to institutional respect, at least among those who
feel that the means, not only the ends, are important.
In the area of statutory construction, a leading case exemplifying the
intellectual chicanery in which the Court is willing to engage is United Steel-
workers v. Weber. 18 ' In Weber, the Court was faced with an affirmative action
plan that reserved half the positions in a training program for black employ-
ees. The Court was also faced with the following language from Title VII:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organ-
176. J. MADISON, FEDERALIST No. 43.
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
179. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation DeciSion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
180. See note 53 supra.
181. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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ization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race .... ",182 Justice Bren-
nan, however, was not'deterred. First, he stated that Weber's "reliance upon
a literal construction [of the statute] . . . is misplaced."' 18 3 He continued,
stating that the prohibition against racial discrimination "must therefore be
read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the
historical context from which the Act arose."' 18 4 The "legislative history"
that the Court relied on was a collection of general statements about the
plight of the Negro in American society. The Court totally ignored, as Jus-
tice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissenting opinion, much more specific
language in the debates, such as Senator Humphrey's statement that "[i]t is
claimed that the bill would require racial quotas for all hiring, when in fact
it provides that race shall not be a basis for making personnel decisions."' 185
Justice Brennan also ignored an interpretative memorandum by Senators
Clark and Case, floor managers of the bill, which stated that "any deliberate
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such balance may be, would
involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would
require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race."' 18 6 Their
memorandum continued: "[employers] would not be obliged--or indeed
permitted-. . . to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or. . . to give them
special seniority rights .... "187 Despite this clear legislative history, Jus-
tice Brennan announced that "an interpretation of the sections that forbade
all race-conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an end completely
at variance with the purpose of the statute' and must be rejected."' 88
Such a method of statutory construction certainly makes Congress' job
easier. Instead of beginning a statute with a statement of legislative purpose
and following with the substantive provisions of the law, now Congress need
only draft the purpose clause and the Court will provide the rest.
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that Weber is wrong, though
it is; the more important criticism relevant here is that it is intellectually
dishonest, a consequence producing far higher institutional cost than mere
error. This decision can only be understood as arising out of a conviction
that equality of result is "the greater good," and therefore the attainment of
the end justifies the means employed. In addition to fostering a well-de-
served lack of respect for judicial processes, such intellectual dishonesty on
the part of the judiciary creates grave risks to the freedom of the nation, 189
for when laws are given a meaning different from that intended by those
who drafted them, we become the subjects of judicial despotism.
The extension of the ratification period for the Equal Rights Amend-
182. Id at 200 n.3.
183. Id
184. Id at 200-01.
185. Id at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Id at 239.
187. Id at 240.
188. Id at 202.
189. See text accompanying notes 194-232 in7fa.
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ment (ERA) is an example of the same "ends justify the means" reasoning
on the part of Congress that the Court has used.' 90 Even if one favors the
ERA, one must feel a trifle uneasy about the extension. The states that have
ratified the amendment approved the proviso that the amendment would be
void if not ratified by the necessary thirty-eight states by 1979. Congress
unilaterally extended the deadline (by a simple majority, not by the two-
thirds needed to propose a constitutional amendment), and the General
Services Administration now refuses to accept rescissions by states of their
ratifications. The entire purpose of having deadlines for ratification is to
ensure that approval by the necessary three-fourths majority of all states is
roughly contemporaneous. Those who favor the extension, however, do not
care. For them, the goal of equality justifies using improper means. If they
succeed, however, they may live to regret it. Principles established in this
controversy may also be applied to amendments now pending concerning
abortion, balanced budgets, and school busing-amendments of which those
who favor the ERA extension may not approve.
Probably no better statement could be found to illustrate the idea that
different legal principles are applicable depending upon the outcome desired
than the statement by Arthur Goldberg that "when the Supreme Court seeks
to overrule in order to cut back the individual's fundamental constitutional
protections against government interference, the commands of stare decisis
are all but absolute; yet when a court overrules to expand personal liberties,
the doctrine interposes markedly less restrictive caution."191
Governmental pronouncements that race is not to be a criterion for de-
cision-making are stripped of a great deal of their educative force by the
willingness to approve the use of race to favor minority groups. After a gen-
eration of being told by the Supreme Court that racial discrimination is "im-
moral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society," we are now told that it is "not a matter of fundamental principle
but only a matter of whose ox is gored."' 192
A democratic society cannot long endure a lack of respect for its govern-
mental institutions. Unless a society is to become totalitarian, where "might
makes right," government institutions must be perceived as being motivated
by guiding principles. The people need not feel that every government deci-
sion that affects their lives must be right-indeed, such could never be the
case. Yet, government must be perceived as legitimate and must Se guided
by some principle other than "it is right or wrong depending upon whose ox
is gored."
D. Political Costs
The foremost, or indeed the sole condition, which is required in
190. See Idaho v. Freeman, 50 U.S.L.W. 2392 (D. Idaho 1981) in which the court declared
that the extension was invalid and the rescission by the states was valid. See also Miller, The
ERA Ratifation Game. Changing the Ruies at Halftime, 8 STUDENT LAw. 9 (Jan. 1980).
191. A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 74-75 (1971).
192. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). For an example of the "gored
ox" theory at work, compare the treatment of racial gerrymandering in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960) with that in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
19821
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
order to succeed in centralizing the supreme power in a democratic
community, is to love equality, or to get men to believe you love it.
Thus, the science of despotism, which was once so complex, is sim-
plified, and reduced, as it were, to a single principle. 193
As discussed above, 19 4 the New Equality is incompatible with free-
dom-the government must act as an ever-vigilant puppeteer, always ready
to pull the strings in order to equalize. The problem is that the strings are
attached to the people. Increasingly more decisions that used to be made by
the private sector are now made by government; increasingly more decisions
that used to be made by state governments are now made by the federal
government. True, there are not yet tanks rolling down the streets, and our
television sets do not yet look back at us; the diminution of our freedom has
been much more subtle. It might be wise, however, to pay heed to the words
of James Madison who stated: "Since the general civilization of mankind, I
believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the
people by silent and gradual encroachments by those in power than by vio-
lent and sudden usurpations."' 195 A memorable quote from Justice Brandeis
points out the danger we face from the well-intentioned:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 1
96
Those who favor the subordination of freedom to equality probably do
not intend that our society be enslaved, but rather that only a small amount
of liberty be sacrificed for a greater amount of equality. Yet, any free soci-
ety, of which there are precious few, that puts any value above liberty,
whether it be equality, safety, or efficiency, cannot long be free. It is not true
that one's liberty should never be restrained; it must be restrained on occa-
sion to protect the liberty of others, but when liberty is sacrificed for a differ-
ent value, the result is a net decrease in the amount of liberty.'
9 7
The erosion of our liberty is manifested in many ways. One of the prin-
cipal ways is by the subversion of the judicial process, whereby courts are
willing to sacrifice principle in order to obtain the "good result,"' 98 thus
rendering the will of the people or their elected representatives nugatory
when that will conflicts with courts' conceptions of the New Equality.
It has not been primarily Congress-and certainly not the framers of
the Constitution-that has sponsored the New Equality. Rather, the New
Equality has been mandated by the courts and by the bureaucracy, the least
193. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 107, at 300-301.
194. See text accompanying notes 107-30 supra.
195. Speech by James Madison, Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788).
196. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
197. See generall J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal
Worth of Ltberoy, in N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS 253 (1975); Hart, Rawls on Ltberty and Its
Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 534 (1973), reprinted in N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS 230 (1975).
198. See text accompanying notes 174-93 supra.
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politically responsible branches of government. 199 Robert Nisbet warns that
the growth of bureaucracy results in an invisible accretion of power and that
the liaison of what he calls the "New Despotism" with humanitarianism
makes for a peculiarly effective movement, this effectiveness most easily mea-
sured by the government's growing capacity for entering into the smallest
details of our lives.20° Wouldn't the framers of the Constitution and the
fourteenth amendment be surprised to learn that pinching a derriere in the
workplace is a federal offense?
2 01
Two areas where freedom is most greatly restricted are in private em-
ployment and in higher education admissions and employment. In employ-
ment, an obsession with disproportionate effects has greatly reduced the
extent to which relevant factors may be used in hiring and promotion deci-
sions. For example, although tests may be used by employers to screen po-
tential employees, if the tests have a disproportionate effect the employer
must demonstrate that the test is job-related. 20 2 Although this sounds like a
reasonable goal, the burden upon employers is great since they must prove
that the test is job-related. This "validation" of tests may cost $40,000 to
$50,000 2 0 3-a substantial deterrent to an employer considering the use of a
non-standardized test.
20 4
Similarly, an employer has a legitimate interest in whether a prospec-
tive employee is pregnant and will be taking pregnancy leave within a few
months of her hiring. Yet, to refuse to hire on that basis is sex
discrimination . 2
0 5
Even more ridiculous, it is also, in many cases, against the law to termi-
nate or refuse to hire someone because of a felony conviction. For example,
the EEOC stated that an employer's policy of automatic termination for any
"serious crime" was a violation of Title VII because a "substantially dispro-
portionate percentage of persons convicted of 'serious crimes' are minority
199. See Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18.
200. Nisbet, The New DespotiSm, 59 COMMENTARY 31, 32 (June 1975).
201. See generally Berns, Tems of Endearment, 261 HARPERS 14 (October 1980); Polansky,
Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, 8 HUMAN RIGHTs 14 (Winter 1980).
202. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
203. This figure comes from Robert Guion, past president of the Industrial and Organiza-
tional Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, quoted in N. GLAZER,
AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY at 57 (1975).
204. George Gilder argues that federal surveillance of employment practices has also been
counterproductive. G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 137 (1981). Because one of the results
of such surveillance is to encourage companies to protect themselves with paperwork, employers
tend to favor documented qualifications of women over drive and aggressiveness of men, despite
the fact that such diligence and motivation are, he argues, the most important contributors to
productivity. Moreover, historically the method used by the lower socioeconomic classes to
achieve upward mobility has not been to become educated, but to work harder than those in
the higher income classes. The current equal rights campaign fostered by administrative agen-
cies has caused discrimination "in favor of the credentials that the rich and middle classes can
buy over the competitiveness, hard work, and drive to get ahead that are the chief assets of the
classes below." Id. Because an employer can estimate aggressiveness and drive only subjec-
tively, he runs a real risk if he attempts to use these qualities in his employment decision. Per-
haps gone forever are the days when an employer could say "I like your spunk, kid; you're
hired," despite the fact that the "kid's" objective qualifications were not overly impressive.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1979).
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group persons ".... 206 Therefore, an employee who had been charged
with resisting an officer, assault with intent to kill, and carrying a concealed
weapon, and who pleaded guilty to resisting an officer, could not be dis-
charged because his crime had no bearing on his ability as a machine opera-
tor. This result was reached despite a showing by the employer that the
automatic termination policy was applied even-handedly with respect to
race. The EEOC stated that "[t]he sole permissible reason for discriminating
against actual or prospective employees involves the individual's capability
to perform the job effectively. This approach leaves no room for arguments
regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the employer." 20 7
Aside from the rather startling implication that questions of expense are not
involved in the determination of efficiency of job performance, the sugges-
tion that it is none of an employer's business whether one of his employees is
prone to violent acts is somewhat dismaying. Certainly, this concern is ra-
tional, and if the employer chooses to terminate such employees he should be
permitted to do so. 20 8 It is a rather queer state of affairs when an employer
can fire his employees for no reason at all (as long as there is no dispropor-
tionate impact on protected groups), but he cannot fire an employee for be-
ing convicted of a serious crime.
In response to the argument that the concerns of the employer are
largely economic and therefore not worthy of protection, one should heed
the following statement by Justice Stewart:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The
right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal"
right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal
right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other.20 9
Thus, those who would advocate freedom in all areas of life, except with
regard to "capitalist acts between consenting adults, '2 10 are misguided; eco-
nomic freedom, like all freedoms, is worth protecting.
In the area of higher education, there is also warrant for concern. 21'
Indeed, Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, has identified
"Harvard's independence and freedom from governmental restraint" as the
206. 4 FEP Cases 849, 850 (1972). See also Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 1158 (8th
Cir. 1977).
207. 4 FEP Cases at 850 (emphasis added).
208. We may take only a little solace in the fact that even in Massachusetts "Inlarrow ques-
tions into whether a person can do, or is available for, the particular job for which (s)he applied,
may be appropriate." Schreiber, Employment Applicattons- What Massachusetts Employers. Can and
Cannot Ask, 65 MAss. L. REv. 69 (1980) (emphasis added).
209. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
210. Votaw, supra note 133, at 12.
211. On the question whether the freedom threatened is "academic freedom" or merely the
same general freedom as threatened by the burden of federal regulation of business, see McCor-
mack, Regulatory Problems in the Modern Unziersi y Setting, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 461.
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"critical issue for the next generation. '2 12 Kingman Brewster, president of
Yale University, has also warned of the "growing tendency for the central
government to use the spending power to prescribe educational policies. '21 3
A clear example of the bureaucratic obsession with the New Equality is
the case of Grove City College v. Harrs.2 14 Grove City involves the attempted
application of Title IX regulations to a small liberal arts college in Penn-
sylvania. Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex. . . be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... 215 Grove City
College has scrupulously avoided accepting federal financial assistance be-
cause of its desire to remain autonomous.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), however,
promulgated regulations defining "recipient" not only as an institution receiv-
ing federal funds, but also as an institution benefiting from federal funds. 2 16
Consequently, HEW claimed that Grove City fell within the ambit of Title
IX because some of its students received federal assistance in the form of
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG) and Guaranteed Student
Loans (GSL).2 1 7 The college refused to execute an assurance of compliance,
contending that it was not subject to Title IX, whereupon HEW ordered
that BEOG's and GSL's of all Grove City College students be terminated.
This termination was ordered despite the fact that there was not "the slight-
est hint" of any failure to comply with Title IX, other than the college's
refusal to submit the assurance of compliance. The district court held that
the college was, indeed, subject to the provisions of Title IX, but that student
assistance could not be terminated.
2 18
The burdens on a college or university that falls within the purview of
Title IX are rather onerous. They include such obligations as requiring a
university to ensure that corporations that recruit on its campus do not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex,2 19 and that student-teacher programs in which
the college participates also do not practice sex discrimination. 220 In addi-
tion, schools face substantial record-keeping and compliance report require-
212. Harvard University Gazette, June 13, 1975 at 1, col. 2, quotedin O'Neil, God and Govern-
ment at Yale.- The Lnits of Federal Regulation of Hgher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 525, 525
(1975).
213. Yale Alumni Magazine, April, 1975 at 34-35, quoted in O'Neil, supra note 212, at 525.
214. 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980). A similar case is that of Hillsdale College, a small
college in Michigan. A resolution by the college states:
Whereas, by the [Title IX] regulations, the Federal government now seeks to impose
its control over [our] freedom and independence through the subterfuge that a few of
the students at Hillsdale College receive federal aid through the medium of such pro-
grams as Veterans Benefits and the National Direct Student Loan Fund; . . .
. . .RESOLVED, that Hillsdale College will, to the extent of its meager re-
sources and with the help of God, resist by all legal means this and all other encroach-
ments on its freedom and independence.
Sex Discritznation Regulations, supra note 148, at 683.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
216. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(h) (1980).
217. 500 F. Supp. at 255.
218. Id at 273.
219. 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a) (1980).
220. Id. § 86.31(b) (7).
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ments. 22' These requirements mandate the expenditure of a great deal of
money, reducing to a large extent the schools' ability to set their own priori-
ties. Judge Friendly has pointed out another danger of heavy regulation of
private schools; that is, as regulation increases, the difference between pri-
vate and public schools decreases. Since private donors contribute to private
institutions to preserve a diversity they deem important, a greater homogeni-
zation jeopardizes an important source of support. 222
With regard to the threat of federal control over curricula, Nathan
Glazer tells of a regional HEW representative demanding an explanation for
the absence of women and minority students in the Graduate Department of
Religious Studies at an Ivy League university. 223 Upon being told that a
reading knowledge of Hebrew and Greek was required, drastically limiting
applications to the program, the HEW representative advised orally: "Then
end those old-fashioned programs that require irrelevant languages. And
start up programs on relevant things which minority group students can
study without learning languages."2 24 Obviously, HEW has neither the stat-
utory authority nor the constitutional power to require that the curriculum
be changed, yet it certainly has the power to influence significantly (by
"raised eyebrow") such decisions because of its control over funding.225
Another example of bureaucracy's attempt to extend its power to en-
force the New Equality is the decision by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
to withdraw the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University because of its
racially discriminatory policies. 226 Because of a belief rooted in the Bible,
the sincerity of which is not questioned by the IRS, that sexual relations
between the races are wrong, the University has a policy of prohibiting inter-
racial dating and marriage among its students.2 27 The IRS argued that,
even though the policies are rooted in religious belief, it has the power to
withdraw the tax exemption-a rather frightening assertion. When a gov-
ernment agency has the power to pass on the acceptability of an organiza-
tion's religious beliefs and practices to determine whether they are in accord
with prevailing notions of social justice, religious freedom is far from
secure.
2 2 8
221. Id §§ 86.3(c), (d), 86.4, .8, .9. See generallv Hearings on Sex Discrimznation Regulatons Before
the House Subcomm. on Postsecondaqy Education, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1975).
222. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUM-
BRA 29-30 (1970). &ee genra O'Neil, Prwate Uniersities and Pub/ic Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV.
155 (1970).
223.: N. GLAZER, supra note 203, at 161.
224. Id
225. Another example of government interference with the operation of the University is
shown by the incarceration of a professor of education for refusing to disclose how he voted in
the decision of a faculty committee that had declined to recommend tenure for a junior col-
league. Daniel Moynihan observed that "the curious thing is that the dog did not bark." Moy-
nihan, State v. Academe, 261 HARPERS 31 (December 1980). Of one thing we can be certain: if
the objective of the incarceration had been anything other than the New Equality, the nation
would have heard a resounding chorus of barks.
226. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
386 (1981).
227. Id at 149. See Note, Tax Exempton and Race Discrinination, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 415
(1980).
228. Congress has expressed its displeasure with such practices by the IRS. See Supplemen-
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In upholding the position of the IRS, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "certain governmental interests are
so compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their
favor." 229 So much for the first amendment protection of religious freedom
that was once called "the transcendent value." 230 (One wonders whether
the court would have eliminated as cavalierly first amendment protection of
racially derogatory speech.) This is not to suggest that there can never be
governmental restrictions on religious practices. Certainly, where such prac-
tices pose an imminent threat to the health, safety, or morals of the commu-
nity, some restriction is possible,23I even necessary, but absent compelling
circumstances-and abstract notions of fairness and equality are hardly
compelling-government.should not embark upon such a dangerous course.
What, after all, is different in principle from the IRS' action in BobJones
and a decision by the IRS to take away the tax-exempt status of the Catholic
Church because of its refusal to admit women to the priesthood? The deci-
sion of the court in Bobjones is as wrong as the hypothetical decision in the
Catholic Church case, for "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
' 232
CONCLUSION
It has not been the purpose of this paper to settle definitively the ques-
tions raised; that is beyond the scope of this article and probably an impossi-
ble task as well. The purpose has been merely to identify some issues that
should be of current concern.
tal Appropriations and Rescission Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-304, 94 Stat. 857, 903 (1980)
(funds appropriated by the Act could not be used in such a way that would cause the loss of tax-
exempt status to private schools).
It could be argued that the Bobjones situation is analogous to that presented in Harris v.
McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), in that the government is merely making the choice of one of two
constitutionally protected alternatives more desirable economically. See text accompanying
notes 114-19 supra. In McCrae, the Court stated that it was permissible for the government to
subsidize abortion and other medical services unequally, because although childbirth and abor-
tion are both constitutionally protected, the government may by unequal funding encourage
alternative activity deemed in the public interest. 448 U.S. at 315. The Court stated that the
constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not prevent a state
from making "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and ...implement[ing]
that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
The situation with respect to religion is quite different, however. If the religion clauses of
the first amendment mean anything, they mean that the government may not make a value
judgment favoring one religion over another. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[g]overnment
...must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice." Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). Freedom of religion means that not only must the government
refrain from planting obstacles in the path of religious exercise, but that it must take a neutral
position in the removal of obstacles already there.
229. 639 F.2d at 154.
230. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
231. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). But see United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
232. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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There is a vast repository of power residing in Congress,2 33 granted by
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. An expansive view of congressional
power carries with it many dangers, chief among which is the threat to indi-
vidual freedom. The shift in emphasis from the Old Equality (equality of
opportunity) to the New Equality (equality of result) has brought with it the
subordination of the value of liberty to current conceptions of equality. The
definitions of liberty and equality used to justify this change are incompati-
ble with the ideals of liberty and equality upon which this country was built,
and the new definitions should be abandoned.
We are becoming a society that refuses to recognize the propriety of
differences. Consider, for example, the movement to subject women to the
draft and the extreme view that women should have the same combat re-
sponsibilities as men do. Proponents of such measures refuse to accept that
biological differences between men and women (primarily reflected in tem-
perament, rather than body strength) justify disparate treatment. The pur-
pose of the equal protection clause is to command a recognition of equality
when people are equal, not to command a declaration of equality when they
are not.
Regardless of whether one favors the New Equality, it is important to
recognize the tremendous price that is being paid for it. To the proponents
of the New Equality, all other social values, such as fairness, justice, effi-
ciency, and liberty are secondary. Whether the goals of the New Equality
are even possible is questionable, and we should bear in mind Edmund
Burke's observation that "those who attempt to level, never equalize. ' ' 23
4
233. See Orloski, The Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments. A Repositog of Legislatwe
Power, 49 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 493 (1975).
234. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 61 (1790).
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